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It was shown in Chapter 3 that recent experience, like that in the
past, has been marked by a long swing in the growth of population,
labor force, and households. It was noted there, however, that the
components of change principally responsible were different in the
recent period, and reasons were suggested for this. Part II pursued
the problem of reconciling recent and past experience with regard
to population growth. The present part similarly follows up the swings
in labor force growth. Here, as has been noted, the most recent swing
is marked by the exceptional behavior of participation rates. The
recent disproportionate contribution of participation-rate change to
the swing in total labor force growth is the subject of the present
chapter; the unusual rise in the rates of older women, the principal
topic of the following chapter.
As the Gordon Committee Report [136] pointed out several years
ago, research on the dynamics of labor force change has been lacking.
Since that time, and partly in response to the Report, some important
new work has appeared.' However, this research, like the current
projections of future labor force, rests almost entirely on data for
the period since 1947,2 reflecting the initiation at that time of regular
sample surveys. These surveys have provided a major new source of
data, whose potential even now is only beginning to be exploited. But
the census data, whose value has been amply demonstrated in several
1Forexample, see the papers and references in (80, 1381. The recently initiated
ManpowerReport ofthe President provides an annual review of the field and
valuable current insights [2021.
2Anotable exception is Stanley Lebergott's work (110].142 / III: LABOR FORCE ANALYSES RECENT AND p:
earliermonographs [12, 52, 106, 116, 126, 1731 have not been brought
to bear on the current discussion either. The present and following
chapters may perhaps indicate the potential relevance of these his-
torical materials to some of the current issues.
This chapter first reviews pertinent aspects of the record of swings
in labor force growth. This can be done briefly, since many of these
points have been covered before. Then an attempt is made to develop
an explanation for recent experience consistent with earlier. Finally,
as in the case of fertility, the discussion touches on the implications
of the analysis for projections, one of the principal subjects of current
controversy.
THE RECORD
The absolute magnitudes of total labor force at decennial or quin-
quennial intervals since 1870 are plotted in Figure 44. The outstanding
feature is the continuous upward trend. Each successive interval in
the ninety-five year period registered an increase, and by 1965 the
labor force total was over six times the 1870 figure of 12.9 million.
However, while the trend in total labor force was continuously
upward, the rate of growth was not constant. This is apparent from
the changing slope and mild undulatory movement of the curve in
Figure 44. This unevenness can be made more explicit if the successive
decade percentage increases themselves are plotted, as in Figure 45.
For a number of analytical problems, it is these changes in total labor
force rather than the stock, that are directly relevant. Hence one
should be careful not to infer that the seemingly mild variation in
the total stock curve of Figure 44 is of little economic significance.
For most of the period, the general sweep of the curve in Figure
45 is downward, signifying a trend toward a declining rate of growth
in labor force. But the movement occurs in a stepwise fashion, rather
than smoothly. And—what is of particular significance—these fluctua-
tions are of sizable magnitude. Thus, from its high of 29.3 per cent
in 1870—80 to its low of 8.3 in 1930—40, the growth rate of the labor
force declined from one decade to the next at a rate averaging around
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TOTAL LABOR FORCE, 1870—1965
'40'50'60'70
three showed much higher declines, in the neighborhood of 7 to 9
percentage points, and three showed virtually no decline or even a
slight rise. As a result, the mean deviation from the 3.5 average was
4.3 percentage points, higher than the average itself. Moreover, this
fluctuation in the decade-to-decade growth rate has continued into
the recent period. From 1930—40 to 1940—50, the growth rate per
decade rose by 5 percentage points. From 1940—50 to 1950—60, it
declined by 3.1 percentage points, and in the most recent quinquen-
nium (1960—65) it has risen again by 2.8 points.
That these swings are not a statistical artifact has akeady been
suggested by several considerations touched on in Part I. First, the
swings in labor force growth exhibit a pattern broadly consistent with
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AVERAGE GROWTH RATE
DECENNIALLY, 18'
SOURCE: Table A-3, column 1.
and the labor market, most of which are estimated from data entirely
independent of those on labor force. Second, if observations cone-
sponding to decennial census intervals are selected from the entirely
independent annual series on immigration, one obtains a sawtooth
pattern similar to that shown by the labor force data for the period
in which immigration was a significant factor in labor force change
(Figure 1). Third, if instead of the aggregate, one studies the major
industrial components of labor force, the sectors in which the swings
appear are largely the same over time (Figure 8).
Nevertheless, because the historical census data relating to the
labor force or the gainfully occupied are known to contain deficiencies
which affect comparability over time, the specific bearing of these
on the present analysis is considered in Appendix F. The conclusion
reached there is that the defects do not invalidate the inference that
longer-term fluctuations in labor force growth actually did occur.
Labor force growth may be subdivided into several underlying
components,along the lines described in Part I, with a view to identi-
fying the role of each component in the swing in total growth. When
FIGURE 45
AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF TOTAL LABOR FORCE: DECENNIALLY, 1870—1950;
QUINQUENNIALLY, 1950—65
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this is done, the following findings emerge (Figure 46). First, prior
to the decade of World War I, the swings in total labor force growth
were predominantly due to corresponding fluctuations in net immigra-
tion. Second, the upsurge in the 1920's was largely produced by the
demographic component of aging and mortality, with the other two
components contributing relatively little. This movement is of interest
because experience since the late 1950's shows some similarity. (This
is suggested by the terminal values plotted in Figure 46 and wifi be
FIGUBE 46
Per cent per decode
AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF LABOR FORCE BY COMPONENT OF CHANGE:
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developed somewhat more fully in the later section on projections.)
By far the most striking movement among the components, however,
and the one of primary interest, is the marked swing in the contribu-
tion of participation-rate change to labor force growth since the 1930's.
It is this movement which is chiefly responsible for the upturn in
labor force growth in the 1940's and its subsequent decline to a trough
in 1955—60. Prior to the 1930's participation-rate change appears to
have played an insignificant role in the swings. (There is even a
suggestion of an inverse movement prior to World War I, but since
the estimates for this period are rather crude, not much confidence can
be placed in this observation.) The startling change in this com-
ponent's role clearly raises the question whether the recent swing in
labor force growth forms a logically consistent part of prior experience.
It is to the analysis of this question that the subsequent section is
principally devoted.
Before turning to this, however, one may ask how the emphasis
here on variability of labor force growth can be reconciled with
Clarence Long's widely known finding on the stability of the age-
standardized labor force participation rate [116, especially Chapter 121.
One point highlighted by the present analytical scheme is that since
participation-rate change is but one component of labor force growth
fluctuations may occur because of movements in other components.
As Figure 46 shows clearly, before World War I labor force pro-
jections based on such stability would have been wide of the mark
unless they anticipated the varying role played by net immigration in
labor force growth A second point relates to the criterion of
stability.3 A one-point increase over a decade in an over-all labor
force participation rate of around 50 per cent has a different meaning
depending on whether one's interest is in the labor force stock or
the change therein. With regard to the stock, a one-point change
alters the total by only one-fiftieth. But with regard to the labor
force change, which in this century has averaged about 14 per cent
per decade, a one-point change alters growth by around one-seventh.
To illustrate,if between 1930 and 1940 the age-sex standardized
rate had really been constant at 53.9 instead of declining "only" 1.7
Lowell Gallaway has conducted a searching examination of this question with
regard to the various component classifications of labor force [74, Appendix A].
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points to 52.2, the labor force increase would have been almost 12
per cent, nearly one-half greater than the actual change of slightly
over 8 per cent.4
EXPLANATION
The Model
The basic elements of the present model are quite simple:
Labor force growth is divided into two components: the first, that
arising from the natural increase of the working-age population, is
autonomous as regards current swings; the second, that due to the
combined contribution of net migration and participation-rate change,
is viewed as
The autonomous component depends on demographic processes,
age changes and mortality, which shape the natural growth of the
working-age population in a given period.
The induced component varies inversely with the unemployment
rate. It is seen as comprising adjustment mechanisms for correcting
labor market imbalances, mechanisms which are set in motion by
changes in unemployment conditions.
The contribution of the autonomous component to labor force
growth in any given period is largely predetermined by prior demo-
graphic developments, principally natural increase some ten to twenty
years earlier. (Unanticipated developments in mortality during a given
period could alter the size of this component, but such occurrences
tend to be rare in modem experience.) The problem of explaining
swings in total labor force growth thus devolves into explanation of
the fluctuations in the induced component. The subsequent empirical
tests consequently focus on this component. Beyond this, there remains
the question of the changing role within the induced component of
Note that the contribution of participation-rate change to labor force growth
is roughly the same as the relative, not absolute, change in the over-all participa-
tion rate. Thus, ceteris paribus,adecline in the rate from 53.9 to 52.2 reduces
labor force growth, not by 1.7, but by 3.2 per cent (1.7 ÷ 53.9).
The analogy with a similar classification of investment in many models of
growth and fluctuation is readily apparent. If the present distinction is valid, it
would imply need for reconsideration of the typical treatment in these models of
population or labor force (the two are often not even differentiated) as an auton-
omous variable.
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migration versus participation-rate change. The present chapter at-
tempts to suggest some pertinent considerations, but no attempt is
made to incorporate them formally into the model.
Tests
As simple as the model is, it is not easy to test it empirically.6
Two tests of the unemployment-induced component relation can,
however, be presented.
First, the analysis in Chapter 2 of the causes of pre-Worid War I
swings in immigration may be drawn on since, as has been seen,
the swings in labor force growth in this period appear to have been
almost entirely produced by immigration movements (Figure 46).
The earlier discussion embraced a substantial part of the nineteenth
century, since the aim was to judge, if only roughly, whether move-
ments in domestic or foreign conditions were principally responsible
for initiating the immigration swings. As for identifying the actual
market mechanism to which immigrants were responding, however,
the analysis must be confined to the last full swing before World
War I, since only for this period are unemployment estimates and
other pertinent data available on an annual basis.
In Figure 47, reference cycle averages for the period 1889—1915
are plotted for the growth rate of aggregate production, for both
the annual level of the unemployment rate and the change in it as
well as for the level of the immigration rate and real wage rate. A
close correspondence is apparent, first, between the movement in the
output growth rate and the change in unemployment rate (inverted);
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The basic problem is lack of annual estimates—for unemployment before 1890
and for the components of labor force change throughout the entire period.
Lebergott [1101 has made annual estimates of the labor force for 1890—1940, but
these are derived by interpolation between decade observations. Though his pro-
cedure is an ingenious one, the estimates do not provide an adequate basis for
developing components of change estimates relevant to the present purpose. His
unemployment estimates, which are obtained as the difference between labor
force and employment estimates, are less open to objection because the employ-
ment estimates reflect at least in part actual experience in each year. Meaningful
annual estimates of the components of labor change could be developed for the
period from around 1947 onward, when CPS data become available regularly in
sufficient detail, but in the present study no attempt has been made to derive such
estimates for periods shorter than a quinquenniurn (the three following 1950).
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FIGURE 47
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE IN AGGREGATE PRODUCTION (hp)
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (Au); AND AVERAGE LEVEL OF REAL WAGE RATE (w),
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SourtcE: Table E-2 and, for aggregate production (nonperishable commodity
output), Table B-2, series 1 and 3.
the level of the unemployment rate (inverted) and that of the immi-
gration rate. In the latter association, the unemployment rate leads
the immigration rate, a finding consistent with the view suggested by
the model that the induced component of labor force growth is a
function of unemployment conditions.
An alternative possibility, that the immigration rate was respond-150 / III: LABOR FORCE ANALYSES RECENT AND P
ing to changes in the U.S.-European wage differential, seems less
likely. To derive an estimate of the differential would require wage
estimates for a number of European countries, a task beyond the
scope of this study. But one can see from Figure 47 that the U.S.
side of this differential, the wage rate in this country, shows not a
swing in absolute level but only retardation and acceleration in the
upward trend. (The swing in wages becomes most apparent only
when one uses the rate of change in the real-wage rate as in Figure
9.) Unless wage movements in Europe were large and synchronous
among the various countries, it seems doubtful that the variations in
the wage differential in the course of a long swing could have been
large in relation to the average size of the differential. Rather, it
seems more plausible, as Lebergott also argues, that while real-wage
differentials contributed to establishing the direction and secular level
of the flow, the fluctuations in the flow were chiefly governed by
variations in the availability of jobs, as reflected in the unemployment
rate.7
A second and more comprehensive test of the model is possible
if the analysis is structured by the periods for which the present
We find only a limited relationship between changes in [U.S.] nonfarm
earnings and migration. The difference between wage levels in the two worlds was
always substantial; short-term changes in wages (particularly small ones) made
little difference in this ratio of advantage" [110, p. 40].
Harry Jerome's study in the 1920's showed the close association between unem-
ployment conditions and immigration during the regular business cycle [96]. The
conclusions of the Immigration Commission, created by Congress in 1907 to study
immigration, provide additional support as to the immediate relevance of unem-
ployment conditions to the flow of migrants [211, p. 25]:
"The immediate incentive of the great bulk of present day immigration is the
letters of persons in this country to relatives or friends at home. Comparatively
few immigrants come without some reasonably definite assurance that employment
awaits them, and it is probably that as a rule they know the nature of that em-
ployment and the rate of wages."
Another alternative proposed by Kuznets, that the level of the immigration rate
was a function of the rate of change in the flow of goods to consumers, is dubious
on both conceptual and empirical grounds [103, pp. 32—33]. Kuznets himself
recognizes the theoretical difficulty of assuming, in effect, that immigrant de-
cisions were influenced not by the level of U.S. per capita consumption but by
additions to the level, though he attempts to escape this problem by arguing that
the additions were particularly relevant to lower-income groups [Ibid., pp. 32—
33]. In any event, as Hickman points out [90, p. 496, n. 7] the scheme implies an
extraordinarily long lag. This is shown in Figure VI-4 where the immigration rate
lags behind the rate of change in aggregate production (a close approximation in
timing to Kuznets' flow of goods to consumers) by a substantial period.
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study has estimated the components of change in labor force growth,
viz.,decennialintervals 1870 through 1950, and quinquennial there-
after. Lebergott's valuable attempt to rough out the unemployment
magnitudes for the part of this period not covered by official estimates
makes possible a direct comparison of the unemployment rate and
induced component of labor force growth for eleven intervals (eight
decennial and three quinquennial) since 1870.
Two series are plotted in the upper panel of Figure 48, the
average unemployment rate (inverted) and the contribution of the
induced component, net migration plus participation-rate change, to
labor force growth in the corresponding interval. While there is some
FIGURE 48
LEVEL AND RATE OF CHANCE OF INDUCED COMPONENT OF LABOR FORCE
GROWTH (L0) AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (U): ACTUAL, 1870—1965;
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semblance of similarity in movement, it is obscured by the downward
trend in the induced component of labor force growth throughout
much of the period. If one follows the procedure adopted in Chapter
4, where a similar problem occurred in the analysis of the birth rate,
and plots the first differences in the two series, a striking correspond-
ence emerges (lower panel). Fluctuations in the first differences of
the induced component match those in the first differences of the
unemployment rate on a one-to-one basis from the beginning of the
period down to the present. The amplitudes of the movements in
the two series conform less closely. Nevertheless, the extent of agree-
ment is surprising when one considers the crudeness of the unem-
ployment estimates for much of the period, and the uncertainty on
the labor force side as to the degree of comparability of the census
figures and the shift to the CPS concept after 1940, with its greater
sensitivity to marginal groups. Indeed, there are some noteworthy
similarities. The expansion phases (designated here according to the
beginning date of the phase) fall in the following descending order
when ranked according to the rise in the rate of change in the
unemployment rate (inverted):
1. 1920—SO to 1930—40
2. 1880—90 to 1890—1900
3. 1900—10 to 1910—20
This is precisely the same order as that obtained when the phases
are ranked according to the change in the induced component of
labor force growth. Thus, in the upper panel of Figure 48, the mild-
ness in the upswing of the induced component in 1920-30 compared
with 1940—50 appears to trace back to differential movements in
unemployment conditions. This is in turn perhaps partly attributable
to the contrasting behavior of the autonomous component in the
two periods—the rise in its contribution to labor force growth in
the 1920's and the decline in the 1940's (see Figure 46)—which would
have contributed to more rapid tightening of the labor market in the
later period.
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On the whole, then, the findings seem consistent with the view
that variations during this period in the induced component of labor
force growth, which reflects the contributions of net migration and
participation-rate change to the labor force, arose in substantial
measure from variations in unemployment conditions. The similarity
between this model and that developed for explanation of swings in
the birth rate will be readily apparent (cf. especially Figure 29 and
accompanying text). In the case of the birth rate, however, where a
part rather than the total of the working-age population was the
subject of analysis (those in family-building ages), it was necessary
to introduce an additional explanatory variable indicative of the
differential experience of that segment.8
Changes Within the Induced Component
There remains the question of the changing importance within
the induced component of participation-rate change versus net migra-
tion, specifically, the rise in the relative importance of the former in
recent decades. It is clear in general where the explanation is to
be sought—in the occurrence of secular developments which on
balance have operated to raise the relative responsiveness of par-
ticipation-rate change as an adjustment mechanism. The most obvious,
and perhaps sufficient, explanation is restrictive immigration legisla-
tion, which has tended to set a ceiling on immigration and also
altered its composition. World Wars I and II would of course also
be major exogenous events reducing the migration flow in their
respective decades.
While these are plausible and probably important factors operat-
ing to reduce the importance of immigration, there are nevertheless
8 This statement implies adoption of the analytical view of swings in the unem-
ployment rate suggested in Chapter 4, footnote 21, as an alternative to that in the
text on that page, namely, that the swings be viewed as reflecting the consensus
of both aggregate demand and supply forces (though, for the most part, move-
ments in aggregate demand have probably dominated the observed swings in the
rate). An analysis of the unemployment rate itself calls for a fully articulated
model of swings, a task beyond the scope of this study.
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some puzzling aspects which must be recognized. The phrase "tended
to set a ceiling"is used advisedly, since the quota laws did not
apply to residents of the Western Hemisphere until the Act of October
3, 1965. Why did not immigration from this area, particularly Latin
America, rise more noticeably? Some response is evident, notably
from Puerto Rico, but also to some extent from Mexico and a few
other areas not enjoying the favored political status of Puerto Rico.
Possible explanations for the limited response come readily to mind—
differences in language and culture, lack of education, financing and
transportation difficulties, and so on. The trouble is that such explana-
tions would seem equally if not more applicable to southern and
eastern Europe before World War I. Yet means were devised to
overcome such obstacles and an immense inflow to the United States
from these areas resulted. Why not the same in the case of Latin
America?
Another puzzling aspect arises from the fact that while the
legislation has a dampening effect on an upswing in immigration, it
clearly does not prevent immigration from declining or even becoming
negative if conditions warrant. The virtual cessation of net immigration
in the 1930's and an actual net outflow in a few years of that decade
is illustrative of this. But the net migration component in the last
two decades has been remarkably stable and has not shown the
responsiveness to weakened employment conditions in the late 1950's
evidenced by the participation-rate component (see Figure 46). It
might be argued that this shows that the immigration level is sub-
stantially below its equilibrium value and that the weakening in the
growth of aggregate demand has not been great enough to alter this
situation. But the net movement from Puerto Rico, one of the flows
included here in the migration component, did in fact drop off sharply.
Yet the migration total did not. Why?
There is perhaps a tendency to assume that the study of United
States immigration is of little current interest. Yet in the decade
1950—60, net immigration accounted for about one person in five
added to the labor force. Clearly there are some important questions
in this area that merit fuller study.
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out one person in five
me important questions
ave there been secular
changes operating to increase the responsiveness of various population
groups to market pressures?A number of factors have been sug-
gesteci as increasing the sensitivity of the female segment of the
working age population—the secular decline in fertility and associated
reduction in family responsibilities; a shortening of the work week
making it easier for married women to accept outside employment;
increased education; redistribution of the female population toward
urban areas and thus closer proximity to markets for their services.
There has also been a secular trend toward more white-collar jobs
relative to blue-collar ones, a development which would probably
favor domestic females as against immigrants (though the compo-
sition of immigration too shows adaptation in this direction [208])
On the other hand, the secular rise in husband's income has presum-
ably worked in the opposite direction. And for the other groups in
the population whose labor force attachment is similarly marginal,
youths and the elderly population, secular changes have probably
worked to reduce their responsiveness. For youths, the principal factor
would be the rise in compulsory education. For the elderly, there
would be, first, the shift from self-employed status in farming toward
employee status in the nonfarm sector, a development that would
increase dependence on others for employment, and, secondly, a
secular rise in income level which would encourage earlier labor force
withdrawal and the formalization of retirement plans.b0
In the present state of knowledge, the question of whether the
forces operating on the domestic population tended on balance to
increase or decrease responsiveness to labor market pressures cannot
be answered with assurance. Taken in conjunction with legislative
and other impediments to foreign supply, however, it seems safe to
say that the relative responsiveness of the domestic supply was in-
creased. This is sufficient to account for the observed direction of
shift in recent decades within the induced component of labor force
Long [1161 provides an extensive survey and analysis. More recently, Mincer
[127, pp. 73—112; 1281 has made important contributions relevant to secular
trends.
10Thisdiscussion implies a trend toward an altered sex-age composition of
those responding through participation-rate changes, a point which is developed in
the following chapter.156 / III: LABOR FORCE ANALYSES
growth in the roles of immigration and participation-rate change.
Clearly, however, a fuller and quantitative analysis of this problem
would be desirable.
PROJECTIONS
In recent discussions of both economic growth and stabilization, the
prospective size and composition of the labor force has received
increasing attention. Labor force projections are a fundamental point
of departure in estimates of future economic growth [11). A basic
problem in public policy efforts to reduce recent unemployment has
been the prospective need to create jobs, not only for those currently
reported as unemployed but also for those who might enter the labor
force as job opportunities expanded [35, pp. 138—140). The bearing
on future labor force growth of the interpretation of past experience
offered here is therefore of substantial interest. This section first
outlines the method currently used in official labor force projections,
and then considers the bearing on these projections of two aspects
of the analytical framework used here—the components-of-change
technique and long swings.
The most recent projection (1964) indicates that labor force may
grow to a total in 1970 of around 86 million; in 1975, almost 94 million;
and in 1980, over 101 million [35]. The implied growth rate in each
of the three quinquennia from 1965 to 1980 is around 16 per cent or
more per decade. In contrast, the rates in each of the three quin-
quennia prior to 1965 were all less than this figure (Table 9, column
1). Indeed, comparison with the decade changes in this century
(Table A-3) shows that the growth projected for 1965—75 is higher
than in any corresponding period except 1900—10, the last decade of
unobstructed immigration.
Present Method
The procedure underlying the official labor force projections is
summarized as follows:
The projections described above represent the authors' best judgment
as to the most reasonable pattern of labor force growth to 1980. It must
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TABLE 9. LABOR FORCE GROWTH BY COMPONENT OF CHANGE,
ACTUAL, 1940-50, AND QUINQUENNIALLY, PROJECTED,
QUINQUENNIALLY, 1965-80








Rate Aging and Net Mi-
Force Growth col. 4) Mortality gration Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1940—50 14.2 9.7 7.8 1.9 4.5
1950—55 12.4 7.7 5.5 2.2 4.8
1955—60 11.1 9.8 7.5 2.3 1.3
1960—65 13.9 13.9 11.5 2,4 0
1965—70 18.6 14.9 13.1 1.8 3.7
1970—75 17.0 15.7 14.0 1.7 1.4
1975—80 15.9 14.5 12.9 1.6 1.5
The general approach was to project labor force participation rates
for each age-sex group, to apply these rates to the future population, and
thereby to derive total labor force by age and sex. The projections are
greatly dependent upon the future size and age structure of the population.
Labor force participation rates for men age 25 to 59 have shown
little variation in the postwar period. These were held constant at the
average level of 1955—57, when over-all unemployment was about 4 per
cent [35, pp. 134—135].
For other age groups where some consistent change in participa-
tion rates is apparent, selected social and demographic factors which
limit or encourage labor force activities were taken into account. After
specifying some of the changes which were assumed in demographic
composition of the population and participation rates specific to cer-
tain groups, the bearing of unemployment conditions on the projection
is explained:
)articipation-rate change.
analysis of this problem
of past experience
:erest. This section first
labor force projections, SOURCE: Appendix Tables A-3, E-3 (1965—70), and B-7 (1970—80).
be stressed that these are long-term projections,reflecting anticipated
changes in demographic composition and changes which might occur in
the labor force activity of the several age-sex groups in the population. tes that labor force may
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around 16 per cent or
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figure (Table 9, column
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e authors' best judgment
growth to 1980. It must
I
-IAlthough there is some interest in a projection of the labor force at
very low levels of unemployment—such as 3 per cent—the post-World War
II experience from which data for these projections are drawn imposes
some constraints.
Therefore, the projections made in this article more nearly represent
a 4 per cent unemployment situation....Forage groups whose labor-
force participation rates have been rising or falling consistently throughout
the postwar period, it was assumed that past trends will continue but at
a slower rate. These trends, however, were adjusted where it appeared
that they might have been dampened in recent years by reduced job
opportunities [ibid., pp. 137—138].
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An important contrast between the labor force and population
projections is apparent. In the latter case, a set of four alternative
projections is presented, with a specific disclaimer to the effect that
no single set is considered superior. On the other hand, in the case
of the labor force projection, only one projection is presented and it
is specifically identified as representing the authors' "best judgment."
The difference in approach perhaps reflects in part the greater number
of specific assumptions that enter into a single labor force projection,
and thus the problems of manageability and exposition that variant
projections would raise. However, while the development of alternative
projections of households poses similar difficulties, an attempt is nev-
ertheless made to present several variants [182, No. 123]. In part, the
differing approach in the labor force projection may simply reflect
a smaller amount of resources available for such work. In any event,
it is clear that while users of the projections may be pleased to have
a single "best judgment" projection, there is a real disadvantage in
relieving these users of the obligation of weighing basic assumptions
so as to choose among alternatives, as is necessary in the case of the
population and household projections.
Uses of a Components-of.Change Analysis
It may be suggested that formally incorporating in the labor
force projection a components-of-change analysis such as that em-
ilAfootnote in the report indicates that an alternate projection was prepared;
but it is not published, though mention is made of a few of its features.
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ployed here would go some way toward meeting this objection.12
Such a scheme helps both in appraising the projection and in con-
sidering alternative possibilities. For example, as has been noted,
the current projection for the 1965—80 period seems to imply an
unusually high growth rate. However, if a partition analysis by
component of change were presented, as in columns 2 through 5 of
Table 9, one would see immediately that the unusually high projected
rate stems largely from the unusually high growth of the working-age
population. Indeed, it is this component which is responsible for the
upturn in labor force growth which occurred between 1955—60 and
1960—65. This lends more credence to the projection than if the rise
in labor force growth to such a high level were found to be chiefly
owing to an upsurge in the contribution of participation-rate change
to labor force growth. Viewed against the longer perspective provided
by Figure 46, experience in 1960—70 is seen as resembling that in
1920—SO, though the size of the current movement is much greater.
The partition analysis further shows, however, that in the 1965—70
quinquenmum the projection does imply a substantial rise in the
contribution of participation-rate change along with a continued in-
crease in the demographic component. It thus directs attention to
the question of whether such a development seems plausible, a
question accentuated by reference to the experience of the 1920's,
when the rise in the demographic component was accompanied by
declines in the others (Figure 46). The partition analysis makes clear
too the part which current immigration is playing in labor force
growth and thus points to the need for assessment of this factor's
likely role. Thus, the components-of-change analysis helps alert users
to elements in the projection which are critical to proper evaluation
of it.
In addition to defining more sharply such basicissues, the
components-of-change analysis readily lends itself to formulation of
alternative estimates. The amount of labor force growth due explicitly
to population change is identified, and this can in itself be viewed as
12 Actually,reference is made, in describing the projections, to the contribution
of population change to labor force growth among men, women, and youths [35,
p. 129]. The proposal here is for a more formal and detailed presentation, and one
that provides historical perspective as well. For an earlier discussion along these
lines, see [58].160 / III: LABOR FORCE ANALYSES
an alternative projection. Indeed, for the most recent quinquennium,
1960—65, a user who adopted this alternative would have been better
off than with the official projection. As is shown in Table 9, column 5,
in this period participation-rate change actually made, on balance,
a zero contribution to labor force growth, whereas the official pro-
jection (made in 1962) implied a contribution from this source at a
rate equivalent to 1.5 points per decade, and a total growth rate
correspondingly higher [193]. This disparity, it may be noted, should
not be viewed as implying that the official projection was incorrect,
for the projection was explicitly based on the assumption of a lower
unemployment rate than actually occurred. An analyst who favored
a different projected contribution from participation-rate change might
do so on either of two grounds—that the actual unemployment rate
might differ from that assumed, or that the sensitivity of participation
rates to unemployment changes might be different.
The assumption that the contribution of participation-rate change
to labor force growth might be zero, and, hence, that labor force
growth would depend on population change alone, is one alternative
projection that comes directly out of the components-of-change analy-
sis. But other assumptions could readily be made of the prospective
value of the participation-rate change contribution, including the
possibility of negative magnitudes.'3 Variant assumptions might be
introduced too with regard to the potential contribution of net im-
migration. In principal, the same is true with regard to the demo-
graphic component, the contribution arising from natural increase of
the working age population. But the likelihood of a poor projection
for this component is small because the principal source of error
13Anassumption that participation-rate change, on balance, would contribute
zero to labor force growth (or some value other than that projected) does not
necessarily imply that no change will occur in participation rates for individual
age-sex groups. Actually, in 1960—65 the direction of participation-rate change for
almost every age-sex group was correctly anticipated in the official projection. As
it turned out, however, the magnitudes involved differed enough so that they
summed to a zero rather than net positive addition to labor force growth, as had
been anticipated. The judgment about a different aggregate contribution may thus
be viewed as merely implying somewhat modified magnitudes of the changes
projected for individual age-sex groups. (If a more precise judgment is desired
with regard to individual groups, a possible procedure is suggested in the next
chapter.)
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(aside from data considerations)is unexpected developments in
mortality. Indeed, an advantage of the present partition scheme is
that, by breaking down the aggregate growth into its underlying
components, it displays side-by-side the elements in the projection
which are both strongest and weakest.
Recently, the official projections have come under fire for being
too low. On the basis of a model estimated for quarterly data for
1947 to 1964, Alfred Tella projects a "full" employment (4 per cent
unemployment rate) labor force in 1970 around one million higher
than the BLS figure [154, 155]. Strand and Dernburg using a different
model and monthly observations from July 1947 to December 1962
(tested through 1963) project a "full employment" 1970 labor force
exceeding the BLS level by 3.6 million [49, 150]. The components-
of-change analysis proposed here can be used to identify more specifi-
cally the differences among several such projections and thus make
it easier to appraise their relative merits. Both of the private pro-
jections accept the population estimates (including the net migration
component) used in the official labor force projection. Thus, assuming
a 4 per cent unemployment rate were to materialize, the issue of
whether total labor force growth in 1965—70 is likely to be at a rate
of 18.6 per cent per decade (BLS), 20.7 per cent (Tella), or 26.6
per cent (Strand-Dernburg), becomes one of whether the net con-
tribution from participation-rate change will be, respectively, 3.7, 5.8,
or 11.7 points per decade. When itis realized that according to
the estimates made in this study, the highest contribution observed
in any preceding period was 4.8 points per decade in 1950—55, some
serious doubts are immediately suggested about the realism of the
Strand-Dernburg estimate, and even the Tella projection seems rather
outsize.'4 The official projection, on the other hand, appears more
plausible.162 / III: LABOR FORCE ANALYSES RECENT AND I
Relevance of Long-Swings Analysis
To this point, I have tried in this discussion to suggest some of the
advantages of explicitly including in the official projections a compo-
nents-of-change analysis along the lines of that presented here. This
proposal is independent of the question of the possible relevance of
the long-swings conception to projections, and it is appropriate to turn
now to this issue.
Skepticism on this score has been voiced by Edward Denison,
who says: "Long-wave analysis tells little about future labor force be-
havior not shown directly by projections based on the age distribution
of the population, school attendance, the retirement age, and so on"
[47, p. 532], in other words, by projections developed along the lines
of the official one. It is undoubtedly true that mechanical extrapolation
of long swings is unwarranted. However, as was observed with regard
to similar strictures by Denison relating to the household projections
(cf. Chapter 3, footnote 22), if relevant aspects of the swings mecha-
nism are at least partly known, then this approach may contribute use-
ful insights, pertinent at least to appraising a projection, if not to de-
veloping an alternative one. The model developed in the preceding
section suggests just such a mechanism and may easily be applied to
evaluating the alternative projections, official and private.
The model indicates that first differences in the induced com-
ponent of labor force growth (the sum of the contributions of migra-
tion and participation-rate change) are a function of first differences
in the average unemployment rate. Appraising the projections to 1970
requires merely: (1) an assumption concerning the average unem-
ployment rate that will prevail in 1965—70, and (2) calculation of the
growth in labor force due to the induced component implied by each
of the projections. Since all of the projections are tied to an assumed
4 per cent unemployment rate in 1970, it is assumed here that this rate
would prevail, on the average, throughout the full quinquennium. The
value of the induced component in each projection is obtained simply
by adding to the implied contribution of participation-rate change the
contribution due to net migration as indicated in the official projection,
since as noted, all three projections accept the Census population pro-
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Implied Contribution to Labor Force Growth, 1965—70





BLS 3.7 1.8 5.5
Tella 5.8 1.8 7.8
Strand-Dernburg 11.7 1.8 13.5
The values in the third column above have been added to Appendix
Table E-3 and the first differences, 1960—65 to 1965—70, derived. These
are plotted along with the first difference in the unemployment rate,
assuming 1965—70 =4per cent, in the lower panel of Figure 48 to
facilitate comparison with past experience. Reference to this shows
that both the Tella and Strand-Demburg implied projections of the
induced component appear exceptionally high if a relationship between
the two series of an order of magnitude like that observed historically
is assumed likely to persist in the 1965—70 quinquennium. The official
projection seems more within the range of plausibility though even it
might be viewed as tending toward the high side.
A corollary of the Tella and Strand-Dernburg analyses of recent
and prospective labor force growth has been the view that public
policy attempts to reach and maintain "full employment" would be
seriously handicapped by the need to create jobs both for those now
reported as unemployed and for members of a "disguised unemploy-
ment group" who were left out or kept out of the labor force by
weakened employment conditions, but who would enter the labor force
as job opportunities expanded. While my analysis agrees with these
studies in its conclusion as to the direction in which unemployment
variations affect labor force growth, the above finding implies that the
magnitude of effect suggested by these studies is seriously exaggerated.
Thus it adds historical support to a similar conclusion reached by
Jacob Mincer in his appraisal of this work [127, pp. 73—112J.
SUMMARY
Labor force growth may be divided into several components, that due
to: (1) natural growth of the working-age population, (2) net immi-
gration, and (3) participation-rate change. For the analysis of swings
:164 / III: LABOR FORCE ANALYSES
in labor force growth, itis useful to view the first component as
autonomous, determined by natural increase some ten to twenty
years earlier. The second and third may be grouped together as an
induced component, first differences in which are a function of those
in the unemployment rate, with the latter viewed as reflecting the net
balance of aggregate demand and supply forces.
The marked swing in the contribution to labor force growth of
participation-rate change since 1940 appears explicable in terms of
two circumstances: (a) variations in labor market tightness operating
via the unemployment rate to generate a corresponding movement in
the induced component; and (b) a reduction in the responsiveness of
foreign relative to domestic labor supply sources, probably due chiefly
to legislative and other impediments to immigration. In attempting to
appraise labor force projections, both the components-of-change tech-
nique and long-swings frameworks seem of value. The current official
projection for 1970 has been criticized as being from 1 to 3.6 million
too low. My evaluation, however, suggests that the official projection
seems more plausible than those put forward by its critics, and that,
if anything, it may be on the high rather than low side. Correspond-
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